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Abstract
In terms of foreign policy and engagement in 
global governance, China has shift from a low-
profile actor to a prominent one under Xi 
Jinping’s government. There are two 
important elements on this shift; on the one 
hand, its growing voice in existing 
international organizations and, on the other 
hand, the creation of its own institutions and 
initiatives of international reach. This work 
analyzes in detail this last pattern with the 
case study of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the BRICS New 
Development Bank. The work will discuss the 
possibility of these initiatives being an 
alternative or a certain challenge to the 
current world order or rather a complement to 
it, taking this issue in the frameworks of 
multipolarity debate and Chinese foreign 
policy.
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Resum del TFG
En termes de política exterior i participació en 
la governança global, la Xina ha passat de ser
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The present work will analyze the existing dynamics of China’s foreign
policy consisting in developing, for the first time, its own international multilateral
institutions as well  as increasing participation with the emerging and existing
ones. A lot of debate has rose concerning this question and it is still difficult to
conclude which are China’s real intentions behind initiatives such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund or the BRICS New
Development Bank.
While some think that its ultimate goal could be settle the basis of an
alternative  model  to  the  current  global  governance  system,  the  main  trend
states that this initiatives are complementary to this current system, a system
which China does not want to overthrow. This last argument is also defended by
the Chinese elites and is constantly stated by the current Chinese Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, in speeches and debates.
These  institutions  cannot  be  explained  without  the  framework  of  Xi
Jinping’s foreign policy agenda, specially the ‘One Belt One Road initiative’, in
which the AIIB plays a major role. The question this work seeks to answer, then,
is if this dynamics and this new Chinese foreign policy can be framed under the
transition to multipolarity and the challenge to the existing global order.
The work  is  structured as  it  follows:  the  first  chapter  will  introduce a
theoretical  framework,  considering,  specifically  multipolarity  theories  and  the
role  of  China  and  the  emerging  powers  within  it.  The  second  chapter  will
discuss China’s role in global governance by doing first  a brief  review of its
transition from isolation to engagement with these institutions. This section will
be followed by another one which will argue Chinese place in this organizations
and the  source  of  the  dissatisfaction  with  this  system.  Then,  chapter  2  will
consider Xi Jinping’s foreign policy and the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative as its
central  element.  Finally,  the last  chapter will  consider the case of  the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank in detail as well as the BRICS initiatives.
The information and data compiled in order to develop the analysis of this
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work comes, mainly, from academic journals and working papers. Some of the
information  was  also  taken  from newspapers,  either  from articles,  news  or
opinion columns, as well as from books and websites, especially those coming
from the institutions themselves.
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1. China in multipolarity debate
China is  usually  treated as a leading actor  within  the existing debate
among scholars and politicians about current world order's transition (or not) to
multipolarity. In fact, there are some academics upholding that we are already
living in a multipolar world order, whereas other voices are still skeptical and
claim that the unipolar system will still  last for some decades, being this last
argument  the  most  defended one.  On the  other  hand,  some other  scholars
argue  that  instead  of  walking  onto  a  multipolar  world  order,  we  could  be
returning to 'bipolarization' or even in a transition to a 'non-polarizated' world'
(Glosny, 2010 p.101).
In any case, nobody doubts that China is playing an important role in this
debate, and its growing ambitions in emerging international institutions as well
as its role in the existing ones (within the framework of its foreign policy) are a
recurrent point of discussion. That is why, before going deeper into the analysis
of  these international  institutions  and its  political  strategy behind them,  it  is
convenient to make a brief introduction to the theoretical framework concerning
the new world order and China's role within it.
1.1 China and the world's polarity after the Cold War era
The end of the Cold War due to the Soviet Union's collapse brought an
unprecedent and anomal unipolar world order that many theorists believed to be
fleeting and transitional, contemplating the future global order as a multipolar
system. In 1992, Chinese former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, defended in
these terms that “the old power configuration, which was characterized by the
confrontation between the two military blocs [...] is entering into a new historical
stage of development heading toward multipolarity” (Xiao, 2010 p.107).
These  theorists  relied  on  realism  theoretical  framework's  ideas  and
claimed that  the  unipolar  system as a  consequence of  the  previous bipolar
world order's disappearance, would be transitional and emerging great powers
would  face  United  States  hegemony  (Glosny,  2010  p.101).  As  previously
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pointed  out,  Chinese  strategists  during  the  90s  decade  would  follow  these
theories. The 15th Congress of the Communist Party of China held in 1997, still
defended that the main trend in the configuration of a new world order was
going to be multipolarity, and, in this context, China had to develop a strategy
focusing  “both  globally  and  regionally,  and  in  both  politics  and  economics”
(Xiao, 2010 p.108). Or, in other words, develop a balance of power strategy.
However, by mid-90s the main trend began to shift towards the 'unipolar
stability' theory as the United States hegemony remained incontestable (Glosny,
2010 p.103). What does it mean in terms of China's foreign policy? As Randall
L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu point out, a strategy consisting on balance of power
in  the  context  of  bipolar  or  multipolar  systems  must  be  considered  as  a
conservative one (Schweller, Pu 2011 p.46).  In other words, it is a strategy that
looks upon preserving the status quo instead of making any substantial change.
In contrast, in the current unipolar world order, a balance of power policy
is,  by  definition,  a  revisionist  strategy as  its  main  goal  is  to  “overthrow the
established order of unbalanced power and replace it with a balance of power
system” (Schweller, Pu 2011 p.46). As a consequence, the unipole develops a
'hipersensitivity'  to  emerging  powers  or  alliances,  which  can  be  seen  as
potential  challenges.  In  this  context,  “balancing  is  not  only  futile  but  also
counterproductive,  as such attempts would likely  lead the dominant  state to
retaliate.  Structural  constraints  limit  the  potential  strategic  choices  for  other
states and incentivize them to cooperate with the unipole” (Glosny, 2010 p.103).
China  defines  nowadays  global  order  within  the  concept  of  'one
superpower, many great powers' (yichaoduoqiang),  which establishes a unipole
(United States) as well as four major powers (which include China) (Xiao, 2010
p.108). One way to understand this 'superpower''s hegemony is by approaching
the international organizations which emerged from the Bretton Woods system,
being the International  Monetary Found (IMF) and the World Bank the most
important ones, as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In this international system, China is a latecomer and must play a series
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of rules which come imposed by, mainly, the United States as well  as other
western countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany or France. China's
strategy  within  this  international  system,  is  being  considered  as
'accommodation'  to  it  while  readjusting  and  configuring  its  power.  But  also,
China is dealing to take advantage of it, in order to gain visibility and power as a
global actor.
At the same time, China is developing a successful strategy of resistance
in these institutions. Some of the tactics employed by China, include gradually
reforming these international institutions (while creating its own ones), setting
the  agenda  of  these  institutions,  voting  against  US  interests  on  them  and
developing a strategy of  soft power towards emerging powers through foreign
aid and economic cooperation (Schweller, Pu, 2011 p.54). But this is a subject
which will be fully discussed in further sections.
Concurrently,  we shall  not  overlook the  indications showing American
decline. Although it remains to be the hegemonic superpower and the gap is still
huge, some theorists point out that the financial crisis of 2008 as well as 2003's
Iraq's  war,  have  seriously  damaged the  global  image  and  legitimacy of  the
United States as world's hegemon (Chan, 2013 p.5). The influence of the United
States and G7 in global economy is also being diminished as the share of G7
countries in global GDP has fallen from 72% in 2000 to 53% in 2011 (Wade,
2011 p.351). 
However, two final considerations need to be made. First, as pointed out
before, the unipole still have the hegemonic power and the gap between it and
the emerging powers is still huge despite this gap has been reduced. Second,
China does not  seek instability  within  the  system and its  relations  with  the
United States. Furthermore, it has been the key for its growth and the United
States is also seeking for complicity. 
1.2 Emerging powers in unipolarity; China and the BRICS
This section will briefly discuss about the emerging powers in this context
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of unipolarity, specially on the BRICS (Brazil, Rusia, India, China and South-
Africa) framework and China's role within them. Robert H. Wade, argues that
one indicator of growing multipolarity in nowadays global order, is the shift from
a North – South trade and investment pattern to an emerging South-South one
(Wade, 2011 p.351). This can be seen as a consequence of the financial crisis
of  2008  but  it  is  mainly  a  result  of  the  growing  cooperation  between  the
emerging powers, in which China and the BRICS are playing an important role.
There was an eight year period between the first time the BRIC term was
presented and their  first  formal  summit  in 2009 (without  South Africa,  which
would  join  a  year  later).  Michael  A.  Glosny,  argues that  China's  process of
joining the BRICS was developed as a step-by-step process, increasing slowly
its grade of cooperation. This was a consequence of China's mistrust on this
kind of initiatives “as any attempt to turn the BRICS into an anti-U.S. alliance
would  backfire  and  damage  China’s  interests  and  its  prospects  for
development” (Glosny, 2010 p.110). 
In fact,  we must also consider that China rejected in 1998 a Russian
initiative of a ‘‘strategic triangle’’ between both countries and India, claiming the
same fear of seeming too much challenging against the United States. The truth
is that it is difficult to find clear evidences which point out that the BRICS are
really balancing against the United States. Given the fact that China is playing
the rules of the existing world order, its role in the BRICS should be discussed
on another terms, specifically those referring to its global and regional economic
and political interests.
While is true that China is not interested in disturbing the existing stability
in its relations with the United States, it is also true that China is concerned
about  reducing  its  big  dependence  on  the  United  States  as  well  as  a
hypothetical lose of freedom and sovereignty due to the unipole's hegemony.
But  Chinese  cooperation  within  the  BRICS countries  goes  further  than  just
seeking less dependence on US; as Glosny points  out,  China has build  an
identity as a developing country, and this identity is another key to understand
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its foreign policy and its strategy within the BRICS (Glosny, 2010 p.114).
Economic  cooperation  and  financial  aid  towards  developing  countries
through initiatives such as the AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) and
the 'One Belt  One Road'  policy,  help China to enforce its own development
while working for the interests of the Global South (Pagán, 2016 p.93). This can
be seen, of course, as a reflection of the Chinese 'soft power' agenda that was
previously discussed about.
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2. China's strategy on global governance
Before  going  deeper  into  the  Chinese  role  in  emerging  international
institutions, this section will discuss how China has been acting towards global
governance from an historical point of view and, also, from the framework of its
nowadays  foreign  policy  agenda.  Despite  all  the  considerations  previously
discussed concerning Chinese interests in not endangering the current system,
we cannot underestimate that its rise represents one of the biggest challenges
which this unipolar system, presented in the previous section, is going to face in
its more than 20 years of history. 
This chapter is structured as it follows: first, a brief historical context will
explain China's entry to global international organizations. Following, China's
role and performance in these institutions will be considered in order to present
the third section of the chapter, an analysis of Xi Jinping's foreign policy and the
One Belt One Road initiative as a key element of it. This chapter will create the
foundations  on  which  the  forthcoming  analysis  of  emerging  political  and
economic international institutions will be settled.
2.1 – China enters the international order
We can identify three great breaking points in China's transition from an
isolated nation to a deeply engaged nation within the international institutions of
nowadays world order. This transition was a result of the Open Door Policy led
by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, which intended to end the protectionist economy of
the  Maoist  era  by  opening  the  Chinese  markets  and  joining  international
economic systems and international economic regimes.
But the first of these three breaking point make reference to the People's
Republic  of  China's  (PRC) entry  to  United  Nations (UN)  in  1971 (Shahwar,
Khalid, 2015 p.46). Despite the fact that the Republic of China (ROC) was an
attending  nation  at  the  1945's  United  Nations  Conference  on  International
Organization in San Francisco and even signed the founding UN treaty (the
United  Nations Charter),  their  1949's  defeat  forced the ROC government  to
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settle in the island of Taiwan while in mainland China the communist regime
under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established.
However, this regime was isolated within the international system as the
United States, and also, the United Nations only recognized the ROC as the
only legitimate Chinese government. In 1972, the United States carried out a
major shift in this policy giving recognition to the PRC as the legitimate Chinese
government.  A year  before,  the  PRC  had  obtained  its  seat  at  the  United
Nations, meaning, this way, the isolation of the ROC's government. The same
year,  the  PRC  entered  institutions  such  as  the  Food  and  Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 1972 it
would do the same with the World Health Organization (WHO). 
A second breaking point  was the Chinese entry in two of the biggest
Bretton Woods system's international institutions. In 1980 the People's Republic
of  China joined the World Bank as well  as the International  Monetary Fund
(IMF). Joining the World Bank allowed China to borrow billions of dollars which
would be used “for economic development and structural reform” (Hempson-
Jones,  2005  p.708).  In  exchange,  China  had  to  devaluate  yuan,  remove
quantitative import restrictions and adjust interest rate.
Regarding  IMF,  China  also  became  benefited  from  measures  which
allowed  the  country  to  balance  its  payment  problems  and  gain  technical
assistance.  However,  as  Hepson-Jones  points  out,  “its  1985  currency
devaluation,  the  elimination  of  restrictions  on  international  payments,  and
insistence on achieving current account convertibility” (Hempson-Jones, 2005
p.709) supposed the PRC's acceptance of several demands of the IMF. This
demands  as  well  as  those  of  the  World  Bank,  brought  a  certain  loss  of
autonomy for China.
The third major breaking point was the Chinese entry in 2001 into the
World Trade Organization (WTO), previously known as General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), whose negotiations started back in the mid-1980s
(Wang, Rosenau, 2009 p.8). As part of these negotiations, and just as we just
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saw in the cases of IMF and the World Bank, China had to engage with some
WTO's key commitments. But, as Marcia Don Harpaz discusses, “China was
also asked to undertake commitments that far exceeded those of other WTO
members” (Harpaz, 2016 p.127).
Harpaz  refers  to  unusual  rules  such  as  anti-dumping  duties  or  high
pressures  in  areas  like  transparency  which  were  not  applied  to  another
countries.  Moreover,  Hempson-Jones  in  his  article  also  refers  to  accession
reforms  which  “emphasize  the  PRC’s  shifting  to  rule  of  law  through  the
introduction  of  an  independent  legal  system”  which  is  quite  important  “with
regard  to  the  company  and  civil  law  that  will  be  required  to  protect  and
encourage foreign investors and traders” (Hempson-Jones, 2005 p.710). 
Despite these measures, we cannot underestimate the fact that its entry
in the WTO accelerated the growth and economic expansion of China which
has “ultimately underpinned its subsequent challenge to the prevailing status
quo” (Beeson, 2014) in this hypothetical transition to a multipolar world. Zhang
Yunling summarizes the benefits of China's entry in the WTO in mainly four: “(1)
achieving  a  high  economic  growth  rate;  (2)  enhancing  competitiveness;  (3)
promoting reform of the economic system; and (4) nurturing the consciousness
of opening and rules-based behavior” (Tellis, Mirski, 2013 p.65). It created, also,
the  bases  for  the  so-called  ‘Go  out  policy’,  which  developed  strategies
concerning foreign investment.
It is also important in this historic context section to take into account the
strategy  which  China  has  been  developing  towards  this  international
governance, specially under the former president Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.
After  Tiananmen events  in  1989,  China embraced the  'tao  guang yang hui'
doctrine,  which  meant  that  the  country  should  have  a  low-profile  in  the
international  relations.  As Peter Ferdinand,  citing the retired PLA’s (People’s
Liberation Army) general Xiong Guangkai in an article wrote in 2010, points out,
China “should coldly observe, secure our positions, cope calmly, conceal our
capabilities and bide our time, keep a low profile, never take the lead and make
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a contribution” (Ferdinand, 2016 p.941). 
However, what it is now clear that this strategy is starting to change, and
the roots of this shift can be witnessed specially in Hu Jintao's legislature, when
China's  rise  achievements  like  the  2008  Olympic  Games  were  presented
alongside with a more proactive role within the international community. This
attitude,  which  was  developed  during  his  legislature,  included  a  growing
contribution with UN's peacekeeping operations, the creation of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SOC), its own security multilateral organization, in
2001  (previously  known as  the  Shanghai  Five  from 1996 to  2001)  and  the
engagement with the BRICS that was discussed previously (Ferdinand 2016
p.942).  Once  presented  how China  joined  the  international  institutions,  it  is
interesting to see which role has been developing within them.
2.2 – China's place in global governance
When the  People's  Republic  of  China was founded back in  1949,  its
attitude to international institutions was mainly hostile. But as I just exposed, the
Open Door Policy and its entry in the United Nations brought a new vision of the
international system, which started to be seen as a sea of opportunities. China's
view hold that integration within this global system was inevitable in order to
reach  modernization.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  proved  that  this  integration
brought China benefits which strengthened its national interests. 
Moreover,  its  entry  in  the World  Trade Organization “consolidated the
influence of liberal economic ideas in China” and also “made internal opposition
to  the  new  world  order  more  difficult”  (Beeson,  Li  2016).  As  previously
remarked,  this  ultimately  brought  the  material  conditions  with  which  China
would hypothetically challenge the current status quo.  
However, China could not play a big role in this institutions during the first
decades since its entry. Wang and Rosenau argue that three factors explain this
trend:
“First, at the time when China returned to the international system, it
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was a relatively poor and weak nation. It sought to benefit from the
resources of international organizations rather than to reshape them.
Second,  as  a  relative  newcomer  the  Chinese  government  lacked
knowledge  of  the  existing  rules  and  mechanisms  of  various
international regimes, let alone the capacity to reshape them. Finally,
in the shadow of the so-called “China threat” perception that rose in
the 1990s, Chinese leaders were reluctant to take an active position
on many international issues” (Wang, Rosenau, 2009 p.23)
But the years following its entry has been being defined in another terms.
Some scholars (Strand, Flores, Trevathan, 2016) (Ferdinand, 2016) (Beeson,
Li,  2016)  point  out  a  certain  frustration  of  the  country  towards  global
governance, being this one of the factors which ultimately explain this recent
leadership in creating its own institutions. In this terms, a study presented by
Jonathan R.  Strand,  Eduardo M. Flores and Michael  W. Trevathan exposes
some interesting data regarding Chinese voice in institutions such as the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, led by Japan.
What these scholars consider, is that while there is little doubt about the
importance of China in the global economy, this has not been matched with a
growing importance within  these institutions.  China is  nowadays the  world's
second largest economy but this status is not reflected in its power within the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Specifically, the study shows an
unequal voting share system which is still favorable to the United States and its
western allies throughout data covering a period from 2005 to 2015 (Strand,
Flores, Trevathan, 2016).
In this period, China's GDP rose from 2,269 billion dollars (2005) to 10,87
billion dollars (2015) (World Bank, 2017), which is almost five times the GDP
from  2005.  In  an  institution  like  the  World  Bank,  which  gives  voting  share
according to its member's status in global economy, it would be expected that
China's voting share multiplied by five in this period. But as Figure 1 shows,
China does not even doubled its 2005 voting share.
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 What stands out in this graphic is that from all the countries considered,
China presents the major change in its voting share but it does not reflect the
overall  changes in its domestic economy and, ultimately,  in global  economy.
While  China's  GDP  has  “surpassed  that  of  Germany,  Japan,  the  UK  and
France, its voting share in the WB does not fully capture this systemic change”
(Strand, Flores, Trevathan, 2016 p.59). It also keeps the United States de facto
veto power in the bank (given the fact that major decisions must be approved
with an 85% of votes) as well as a big role to Japan and little changes for other
emerging powers such as Russia or India. 
Figure 1: Changes in World Bank's voting shares from 2005 to 2015
Source: Author’s. Adapted from Strand J.R., Flores E. and Trevathan, M. (2016) China's
Leadership in Global Economic Governance and the Creation of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, Rising Powers Quarterly, 1 (1) p.59 Copyright 2016 by Marmara University
 We can see this same pattern in the Asian Development Bank's voting
share system in the same period. In the Asian Development Bank, in fact, China
has reduced in a 0,11 % its voting share, going from a 5,57% in 2005 to a
5,45% (Strand,  Flores,  Trevathan,  2016 p.61).  Japan and the United States
hold, each one, a 12,79% of the voting share, which is a 0,25% less than 2005,
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when they had a 13,04%.
There  is  little  doubt,  then,  that  Chinese  voice  in  these  international
organizations does not have the weight that China considers it should have.
Moreover, it does not seem to fully guarantee the financial aid that China would
need to  develop its  foreign policy agenda.  Of  course,  we could think about
reforming the existing system in order to give more voice to China within it. But
nowadays this seems like a remote option given the fact that the US Congress,
for instance, has failed to pass reforms which would have given China more
voice within the IMF (Callaghan, Hubbard 2016 p.123). At the same time, the
World  Bank  approved  reforms  concerning  the  voting  share  system in  2010
which, as we have just seen, does not reflect  the evolving global  economic
system (Strand, Flores, Trevathan, 2016 p.57) 
However,  Callaghan  and  Hubbard  conclude  that  despite  the  US
Congress would have approved this measures,  “it  is  highly likely that China
would  still  have  proposed  the  establishment  of  an  institution  like  the  AIIB”
(Callaghan,  Hubbard 2016 p.123).  What  is  clear  is  that  a  certain  degree of
frustration  in  China  concerning  these  international  organizations  has  been
settled. If this is the main factor which explain the growing interest in China in
global governance and its leadership creating its own institutions, or just one
more  among  many  other  arguments  is  something  that  will  be  discussed
subsequently.
2.3 – Xi Jinping's foreign policy; the 'One Belt One Road' initiative
This chapter's section would consider the Chinese shift in foreign policy
under Xi Jinping and the major initiative it has started to develop, the 'One Belt
One Road' initiative, which would settle the basis of the forthcoming analysis.
An important issue which was previously remarked, is the material accumulation
of China due to its economic development and its consequences in reshaping
the international  system in  terms of  power.  Mearsheimer,  one of  the  strong
theorists of the realist paradigm in International Relations theory, also considers
that  this  reshaping  will  have  “ideational  and  policy  making  consequences”
(Beeson, Li, 2014 p.491)
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As  a  consequence  of  this  accumulation  of  material  power,  we  can
witness two phenomenons: the growing engagement in international multilateral
organizations  that  was  presented  previously,  and  the  foundation  of  its  own
institutions. We have taken into account the possible dissatisfaction of China
towards existing international organizations, but now it is necessary to study Xi
Jinping's foreign policy and how these institutions match within it.
One central  issue is  the domestic  debate among scholars  and policy
makers about the approach which China would have to develop in the global
system. While there is a consensus on the unjustified influence which the US
keeps in the global governance, the main trend is to keep strengthening its role
within it (Beeson, Li, 2014 p.493). In June 27 th of 2015, in a speech at the 4 th
World Peace Forum, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, shed light
on key foreign policy ideational questions, which can be summarized into three:
a) The idea of China as a  'contributor' and 'facilitator' when talking about
China in the regional and international order.  Yi  even highlighted the role of
China in the creation of the United Nations and claiming that they “wouldn't
overturn what we had helped to build” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China, 2015).
b) The need to reform international order and system in order to give
developing countries the place they deserve and thus “make it more fair and
equitable,  and  better  serve  the  aspirations  of  the  international  community”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2015). Yi also
pointed out that China “should embrace three basic principles in the evolution of
international  relations,  namely,  more  multilateralism  and  less  unilateralism;
stronger rule of law, not the law of the jungle; and greater democracy, not power
politics” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2015)
c)  The idea of  breaking the so-called 'law of  history'  on which states
accumulating power also seek hegemony.
Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored the implications in the regional and
international order of China's growing involvement in the territorial disputes in
the  South  China  Sea  as  well  as  its  conflict  with  Japan  concerning  the
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Diaoyu/Senkaku  islands,  could  have.  As  Ferdinand  points  out,  China  has
hardened its line in these terms but, at the same time, he observes that there is
a contradiction between this conflict dynamics and a certain moderation and
cooperation with the US. Specifically, China has been acting like a diplomatic
moderator in issues concerning US and its crisis with Iran, Syria or North Korea
(Ferdinand,  2016 p.949).  Moreover,  the  One  Belt  One Road  initiative  could
appease these conflict dynamics in favor of mutual economic benefits.
But, at the same time, China's foreign policy, specially through the One
Belt One Road initiative, is certainly challenging the US strategy towards the
region,  the  so-called  'pivot  to  Asia'.  However,  this  strategy's  future  is  quite
uncertain due to Donald Trump's apparent different visions of it in contrast with
Barack Obama's and Hilary Clinton's, being also uncertain the proliferation of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative. What can be witnessed, then, is a
quite complex network of interests that China is facing with the logic of 'win-win'
cooperation, which is highlighted by the One Belt One Road initiative. But also,
a future full of doubts and challenges that these initiatives will have to face.
2.3.1 – 'One Belt One Road'; global and regional implications
In  October  2013,  Xi  Jinping  announced  his  central  economic  foreign
policy  initiative,  the  creation  of  the  so-called  ‘Silk  Road Economic  Belt’ and
‘Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century’, conforming both what we know
as the ‘One Belt,  One Road’ initiative.  This Silk Road Economic Belt  would
connect  China with  Central  Asian republics as well  as Russia,  Iran,  Turkey,
Mongolia, the Balkans, Center and eastern Europe and ultimately Germany and
the Netherlands (Ferdinand, 2016 p.950). 
The  Maritime  Silk  Road  would  link  south-east  China  with  south-east
Asian countries, Bangladesh, India, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean,
ending, as well as the Belt Road, in Germany and the Netherlands (Ferdinand,
2016  p.450).  Strategically,  this  development  of  infrastructure  and  facilities
through the connection with Europe, will help to boost and consolidate Chinese
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economic  growth,  which,  must  be  noted,  it  is  sustained  by  an  economy
depending on exportation. giving China facilities to expand its market as well as
“improving  security  for  its  energy  imports  via  overland  routes,  increasing
China’s soft power through greater cultural and tourism exchanges, contributing
to  regional  economic  integration  and  improving  China’s  regional  security”
(Callaghan, Hubbard 2016 p.121) as well as its geopolitical influence. 
Hong Yu  points  out  four  major  motivations  which  help  to  explain  the
origins  of  this  initiative  within  the  framework  of  the  previously  considered
strategic  implications.  On  the  one  hand,  China  will  settle  bilateral  and
multilateral  economic  integration  through  building  infrastructures  in  these
countries and creating, this way, a connectivity which will also help the country
to relocate stock from its export-oriented manufacturing industries (Hong, 2016).
Some  argue  that  China  seeks  to  change  its  traditional  export-led
economy  and  growth  system  towards  consumption  and  demand  boosting
reforms (Tellis, Mirski 2013 p.65), but Chinese exports are still crucial. In the
previously discussed Chinese logic of ‘win-win’ cooperation, this is also seen as
beneficial  for,  for  example,  South-east  Asian  countries  which  depend  on
Chinese materials to boost their industries (Hong, 2016).
A second major motivation for China according to Hong, is the strategy
for some Chinese companies which will be benefited from the OBOR initiative,
specially those of the building sector, which suffers from a certain stagnation in
the country. (Hong, 2016) This factor alongside with the previous one, will also
help to boost Chinese economy and consolidate its growth and its economic
power. 
The third major motivation is the development of the western regions of
the country through the initiative, specially Xinjiang and Yunnan (Hong, 2016).
Regions which still lack from good infrastructures and, as Ferdinand points out,
by 2015 it is estimated that will going to need between 30 or 50 years to catch
the development level of the rest of China. Then, the OBOR initiative is also a
tool for accelerating this process (Ferdinand, 2016 p.951).
Moreover, regions such as Yunnan could improve its prosperity by taking
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advantage from its geographical  position given the fact  that it  borders three
ASEAN countries (Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) and it is also close to India and
Bangladesh,  Thailand and Cambodia.  As Hong argues,  “implementing these
initiatives  will  improve  inter-regional  connectivity  of  the  land-locked  western
regions and allow them direct access to port facilities in neighboring countries”
(Hong, 2016) .This situation could give the region prosperity by acting like an
international gateway for China in the One Belt One Road initiative. 
The final major argument presented by Hong is that of achieving the so-
called ‘China dream’ and increasing its position within the global system (Hong,
2016). Many readings of this argument can be made and some of the most
supported ones will be presented; starting with Hong, he argues that the OBOR
initiative would act as a Chinese analogue to the United States Marshall Plan,
through which the US helped Europe to reconstruct after World War II through
investment (Hong, 2016).
Another analogy is presented by Ferdinand, which points out that  the
OBOR possess some of the logic under which the European Coal and Steel
Community  was  created,  specifically  that  of  building  shared  cross-border
infrastructure in order to boost foreign policy cooperation and reduce possible
conflict  dynamics.  What  Ferdinand  also  argues,  is,  however,  that  this
cooperation  is  made  in  different  terms  that  in  Europe;  while  European
cooperation was made in terms of integration, this Asian cooperation is made in
terms of connectivity (Ferdinand, 2016 p.950). Beeson and Li go deeper into the
regional implications, arguing that the OBOR initiative help consolidating China
as a leader in a region in which nowadays is already playing a central  role
(Beeson, Li 2016 p.496).
Two final considerations about the One Belt One Road initiative shall be
made. First, it has to be considered that the OBOR initiatives is also helping to
integrate  the  existing  regional  cooperation  systems  and  improving  its
connectivity. As Hong points out, “these cooperation mechanisms include the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN Plus China (10+1), China-
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Expo, Asia-Pacific Economic
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Cooperation (APEC), and Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation
(GMS)” (Hong, 2016). This is very important in order to seek support for the
initiative from these countries, something is successfully developing.
Finally,  the  OBOR  initiative  will  have  to  face  several  challenges.
Ferdinand argues that political instability of some of the supporting countries
and the fears of a growing profile of China in the global order from some other
countries are two of the most significant ones. In this context, the importance of
institutions like the AIIB being multilateral is a key element as Callaghan and
Hubbard point out, given the fact that some of these countries would find more
easy  to  accept  financing  from  this  multilateral  institution  despite  being
dominated by China, than from China itself (Callaghan, Hubbard 2016 p.119).
But also, China will have to face the US ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy, despite it
is likely to be changed, as well as the Russian worries about the OBOR initiative
being  stronger  than  its  ‘Eurasian  Customs  Union’  and  ‘Eurasian  Economic
Community’  initiatives,  which  link  Russia  to  central  Asia  (Ferdinand  2016,
p.952).
In sum, domestic and international interests can be witnessed in this One
Belt  One Road initiative.  Regarding the former,  China wants to  stimulate its
State  Owned  Enterprises  as  well  as  private  companies  which  suffer  from
overcapacity  in  the  context  of  a  certain  stagnation  in  domestic  market,
especially in economic sectors such as building. Also, the OBOR initiative acts
as  a  ‘natural  expansion’  for  China’s  ‘Go  West’  policy,  which  aimed  to  the
development of the Western regions of the country such as Xinjiang, a region
whose inequalities remain as one of the main factors which ultimately explain its
ethnic tensions. 
The third domestic implication for OBOR concerns to China’s economic
model, preserving its  export-led economy at the same time it develops policies
which  boost  internal  demand  and  consumption.  Regarding  the  international
interests, China is engaging in infrastructure investment to reinforce its regional




Which stands out in nowadays Chinese foreign policy is the fact that, it is
not only willing to play a bigger role in the existing international institutions, but
also creating, for the first time, its own multilateral international organizations. It
seems that China cannot trust in reforming the existing international system as
well  as  having  its  projects  financed  by  the  World  Bank  or  the  Asian
Development Bank. In this context, China seems to prefer leading the way and
creating structures which fully reflect its importance in the global economy. 
At the same time, the BRICS also started to create its own institutions
and China is playing a proactive role within them, being one of these the New
Development Bank, which can complement the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank in serving the foreign interests of China.
It is interesting to see how the AIIB, the NDB and the OBOR initiative fit
with a major change in development policies in the global context. In an article
wrote  in  May 17th 2017 by  Branko  Milanovic  in  the  British  newspaper  ‘The
Guardian’, it was stated that the development model supported by the Western
countries in the last decades is deciduous and no longer valid for the emergent
markets.
This  model,  which  started  in  1989  as  the  so-called  Washington
consensus, aimed to political and institutional reforms in these countries rather
than investment, loans and building. The theory behind this model holds that
these political and institutional reforms would allow the private sector of these
countries to develop this investment, loans or building policies. In these terms,
the OBOR initiative and the institutions presented in this work, represent,  in
words  of  Milanovic,  a  development  model  previous  to  the  Washington
Consensus (Milanovic, 2017).
 This final chapter will consider the most significant one of this Chinese
institutions, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which represents one of
the key elements under which the OBOR initiative will be developed. It will also
discuss the New Development  Bank creation and China’s  possible  interests
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from this institution as well as from the BRICS themselves.
3.1 – The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
In the context of an economy strongly dependent from exports and trade,
the difficulties in the Asian region regarding infrastructures are a big barrier for
China.  These difficulties are specifically  due to  infrastructure deficit  in  some
regions. A study published by the Asian Development Bank in 2009, shed to
light that a huge investment of $8 trillion should be made between the period
from 2010 to 2020 in national  infrastructure. Additionally,  $290 billion dollars
should be also invested in  regional  projects.  (Xiao,  2016).  The same study,
remarked that  the  ADB has “less  than $80 billion  in  capital,  and the  World
Bank's member states have subscribed to $223 billion of subscribed capital. In
practice, the latter can only loan some $50 billion per year to different parts of
the world, including Asia” (Xiao, 2016).
These  investment  should  be  made  in  a  variety  of  sectors  including
electricity (49%), transport (35%), information and communication technologies
(13%)  and  water  and  sanitation  structures  (3%)  (Pagán,  2016  p.94).  This
context of infrastructure deficit is both a barrier to Chinese economic interests
as well as negative to APEC and ASEAN countries. China faces this challenge
with  the  One  Belt  One  Road  Initiative  as  an  opportunity  to  build  railway
networks, ports and highways to reduce this barrier. However, it seems to lack
investment and financing, something improved by the financial crisis of 2008.
China wants  to  solve this  financing  issue with  its  Asian Infrastructure
Investment  Bank,  which  is  closely  related  to  the  OBOR  initiative.  This
multilateral bank was presented in October 2013 and, just a year later, 21 Asian
nations already supported the institution. Nowadays more than 70 countries1
has signed the agreements, some of them close US allies such as the United
Kingdom, and key allies also, in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Australia or
1 The last membership expansion until date (June 2th 2017) was approved in May 13th and it 
included as prospective members regional actors such as Bahrain or Cyprus, as well as 
non-regional ones like Bolivia, Chile and Romania. This brings AIIB’s membership total 
number to 77 (China Daily, 2017).
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South Korea (Callaghan, Hubbard, 2016 p.120).
Regarding to its cooperation with the existing institutions, it can be found
that the bank, in fact, is working alongside with the World Bank and the Asian
Development  Bank,  which,  in  both  cases,  even  signed  a  memorandum  of
understanding for better cooperation between institutions. Thus, and returning
to previous considerations made in this work, seems clear is that China does
not want to derail the system without which it could not have achieved its power.
The  capital  base  settled  was  $100billion  dollars,  making  the  bank  a
medium-sized one, smaller than the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank but bigger than, for instance, the African Development Bank or the Islamic
Development Bank. Callaghan and Hubbard, in their work, show an interesting
(Figure 2) which help to witness its relative power comparing it to the banks
previously described in terms of capital base (Callaghan, Hubbard, 2016 p.121).
Figure 2: Multilateral Bank’s Subscribed Capital ($US million)
Source: Adapted from Callaghan, M., & Hubbard, P. (2016). The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road. China Economic Journal, 9(2) p.121
Copyright 2016 by Peking University
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One remarkable issue regarding to the founding members of the bank,
recalls in the lobbying that United States did to some of its allies in order to not
join the bank. One of these countries was the United Kingdom, being also the
first G7 country which joined the bank as a founding member. Hong sees this
decision as primary based on its national economic interests (Hong, 2016). 
“Britain  wants  a  share  of  the  potentially  huge  infrastructure
construction market in Asia, and seeks to strengthen London’s role
as  a  key  international  financial  center  by  tapping  into  the  rapid
economic growth of China and the other emerging Asian economies”
(Hong, 2016)
This pattern was followed by France, Italy and Germany as well as other
US  key  allies  such  as  Israel,  challenging  then  America’s  opposition  and
becoming founding members (Xiao, 2016). This move apparently meant a major
change in China’s strategy within bank, being initially an Asian bank and with a
50% of voting share in Chinese hands as 50% of the base capital would be, in
fact,  Chinese.  But  increasing  the  number  of  founding members,  meant  that
voting shares structured by capital lending ultimately decreased China’s power
in its bank, leaving the country with a voting power of 26.1%. 
This does not removed the veto power from the hands of China, given
the fact that major decisions need a 75% of total votes, but as more countries
join the bank, the more will decrease this voting share (Pagán, 2016 p.97). In
these terms,  Pagán shows that a  hypothetical  incorporation of  Japan to  the
bank would leave China with a 22.7%, which means that it would loose its veto
power. But Pagán argues that China would not deliberately try to keep it, and
this could be seen as part of a ‘soft-power’ strategy in order to not make an
authoritarian image of itself (Pagán, 2016 p.97).
Voting share system is  not  the only  interesting thing regarding to  the
bank’s structure. It is shaped in order to give more power to the Asian regional
actors, holding the 75% of the total capital stock. Also, 9 of the 12 members of
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the Board of Directors will be members from this regional membership, even
with the possibility of a non-Chinese member being the President (Callaghan,
Hubbard 2016 p.131). Despite this regional benefits and different voting share
according it,  the AIIB is shaped like the Multilateral  Development Banks we
already know.
The first projects the bank has approved seem to consolidate it as a true
multilateral  institution  and  not  just  a  “cover  for  a  Chinese  dominated  body”
(Callaghan, Hubbard, 2016 p.134) which ultimately serve to Chinese interests.
Figure 3 shows all the approved projects hitherto (June 2 th 2017) as well as its
sector and loan value. What we can see is that, in fact, investment in countries
which  need  aid  in  infrastructure,  energy  and  transport  sectors  is  being
approved,  showing  that  the  bank  intentions  go  beyond  those  regarding
exclusively to defend Chinese interests.
Moreover, Figure 3 shows clearly how the AIIB is working closely to the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, co-financing almost all of these
projects,  like  the  Pakistan  Tarbela  5  Hydropower  Extension  Project  or  the
Azerbaijan:  Trans  Anatolian  Natural  Gas  Pipeline  Project  (TANAP).  It  is
coherent then with the bank policy and also with the Chinese foreign policy
discussed previously, with some of these projects also fitting with the ‘One Belt
One Road’ initiative goals. But it  is also coherent with its business plan and
other  Chinese-led  initiatives  such as  the  China–Pakistan  Economic  Corridor
(CPEC).
Figure 3: Projects approved by the AIIB
Name of the project Country Sector Loan
Tajikistan: Dushanbe-








2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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Bangladesh: Distribution 
System Upgrade and 
Expansion Project
Bangladesh Energy $165 million
(total loan)

































Oman: Railway System 
Preparation Project
Oman Transport $36 million
(total loan)
Oman: Duqm Port 
Commercial Terminal and 
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Development Project
Oman Transport (port) $265 million
(total loan)
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Source: Author’s. Adapted from Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2017) –
Approved projects Retrieved: 26 April 2017 https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html
As Callaghan and Hubbard expose, the function of the AIIB could not be
clear in its origins pointing out that it will have to deal with “whether its focus will
be primarily assisting the development of low income countries in the region
and help them reduce poverty, or whether it will have a broader remit and focus
on the ‘development’ of all countries in the region” (Callaghan, Hubbard 2016 p.
135). Concluding that if it is truly a multilateral institution, it will have to promote
the interests  of  the  full  region,  not  only  in  countries  related  to  its  interests,
something that Figure 3 does not fully answers. 
And there is also the question discussed previously regarding if whether
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the AIIB is a useful tool for development and investment in the region or just a
cover to develop the ‘One Belt One Road’ and serve to internal politic issues.
This is something that Pagán believes to be a central question regarding the
future of the bank, because, as previously remarked, China could also use the
AIIB  to  deal  with  the  question  of  what  to  do  with  its  big  foreign  exchange
reserves, investing them abroad (Pagán, 2016 p.96).
It was also exposed that China seeks to open new market opportunities
for its companies at the same time it develops and consolidates a growth model
still led by exports but slowly shifting towards the domestic demand stimulation
reforms.  Pagán  also  argues  that  Chinese  domestic  interests  are  also  in
stimulating  domestic  employment  opportunities  (while  at  the  same  time
alleviating  the  problem  of  overcapacity  in  certain  sectors  Of  the  Chinese
economy) and, finally, to contribute to the internationalization of the yuan, being
this factor a key element to be considered together with the foundation of the
AIIB because “the AIIB founding and RMB internationalization are interlinked
vectors driving economic integration between Asia and the rest of the world”
(Mercy, Tang, 2015).
3.2 – The BRICS New Development Bank
Despite  its  clear  implications  in  development  policies,  the  Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank is not properly a ‘Development’ bank as its main
goal is investment in infrastructures and serving as well as a key element on
Chinese foreign policy agenda. But this bank will likely join another initiative led,
in this case, by the BRICS which is settled as a Development Bank helping with
poverty  issues  and  in  which  China  is  playing  also  an  active  role.  China’s
interests in the bank, however, are not fully economic ones; as stated in the first
section of the work, it is also part from a soft power agenda carried out towards
the ‘Global South’ countries.
In the same way as China seemed to show frustration and dissatisfaction
with the current global governance system, other emerging powers have shared
this view. The BRICS countries which were presented in the first chapter of the
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work, are five emerging powers and emerging economies which host more than
2.8 billion people, which is the 40 percent of the world’s population. In terms of
economic weight,  the BRICS countries account for more than 25 percent of
global GDP (BRICS, 2017).
But, as previously discussed in the Chinese context, the BRICS possess
just 11% of the votes in IMF, despite accounting for more than 20% of global
economic activity. Despite these facts, the BRICS together only have a 13.24%
of World Bank voting share and a 14.91% of IMF voting shares (BRICS, 2017).
In these terms, it was exposed the failure and difficulties to reform the system
through the case of the US Congress voting against World Bank’s reforms.
But, also, the US Congress denied reforms regarding to the International
Monetary Fund. This situation was indicated in the press note with which the
BRICS presented the New Development Bank.
“The  Leaders  also  reaffirmed  their  disappointment  and  serious
concern at the non-implementation of the 2010 IMF reforms, and its
impact  on  the  Fund's  legitimacy  and  credibility.  Undue  delays  in
ratifying  the  2010  agreement  are  in  contradiction  with  joint
commitments by the G20 Leaders since 2009. In the event that the
United States fails to ratify the 2010 reforms by the year-end, they
called on the G20 to schedule a discussion of the options for next
steps that the IMF has committed to present in January 2015. They
also emphasized the need to continue the IMF reform processes”.
(Sarkar, 2015)
In July 2014 the BRICS announced the creation of the New Development
Bank as its own institution regarding development and fighting against poverty,
as  well  as  the  Contingent  Reserve  Arrangement  (CRA),  its  institution  for
monetary and balance of payments issues. The bank will  be operating from
Shanghai and its membership, as the AIIB, is open to countries which do not
necessary belong to the BRICS (as long as the BRICS total vote share remains,
32
at least, in 55%) (Epstein, 2015). One of the sources of China’s interests for this
bank is the fact that it will be prioritizing infrastructure building in contrast with
“other priorities (such as education, healthcare, women’s rights, etc.) towards
which the World Bank has been drawn in recent decades” (Khanna, 2014 p.47).
The bank reached the AAA credit rating in March 22th 2016, starting its
first loans on the next month (BRICS Post, 2016). These firsts projects in which
the  New  Development  Bank  will  be  engaged  show  an  interesting  pattern,
focusing  on renewable  energy projects  in  6  of  the  7  projects  it  is  currently
involved to date (June 2th 2017) (New Development Bank, 2017). 
A common point of discussion regarding the New Development Bank and
the  Contingent  Reserve  Arrangement  is  that  they  are  analogues  and  rival
institutions  to  the  World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Found
respectively. But, in the same way as the AIIB, it is not clear that these BRICS-
led institutions seek to overthrow the current system. As well as the AIIB, the
New  Development  Bank  has  signed  memorandums  of  understanding  for
collaboration  with  institutions  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  European
Investment Bank (Maswanganyi, 2016). 
Moreover,  this  discussion seem to ignore one truly  interesting pattern
presented by this bank as well as the BRICS itself and the CRA, that is the
developing  of  South-South  cooperation,  in  which  China plays  a  big  role  as
discussed  in  the  first  chapter.  This  is  another  source  of  interest  for  China
regarding this bank and its foreign policy agenda.
And, also, the financing needs of countries which belong to this ‘Global
South’, as we just saw in the previous section. The European Comission, in a
strategic note published in April 24th 2015, stated that the AIIB, the NDB and the
CRA represents  a  combined  capital  base  of  250$  billion  which  “would  be
equivalent to over 40% of the current stock of MDB loans to emerging markets
(estimated at $693 billion) and over 90% of the current stock of MDB loans to
Asian  emerging  markets  (worth  around  $328  billion)”  (European  Political
Strategy Center, 2015). This note concluded that there is little doubt about these
institutions to be acting as a global economy and development accelerators. 
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It remains to be know if this initiative, as well as the BRICS themselves,
will  keep playing  the  role  of  the  last  years  given continuous disagreements
between these five countries as well as the big changes regarding to Brazil’s
political situation as a consequence of Dilma Rouseff’s impeachment and the
nowadays government of Michel Temer. Regarding the former, Epstein, on the
contrary, states that this can be seen as a strength rather than a weakness,
arguing that “as they transcend regionalist restrictions and become a kind of
cosmopolitan non-West,  champion of sorts for those weary with the state of
things”  (Epstein,  2015).  And  also,  as  previously  discussed,  as  a  tool  which




The economic  crisis  of  2008  was  also  a  certain  crisis  for  the  global
governance system led by the United States since the end of the Cold War. In
the  ‘Global  South’  countries,  certain  measures  approved  by  the  IMF
delegitimized this system at the same time that terms like ‘sovereignty’ started
to loose its meaning. This process of loss of legitimacy was followed by, also, a
loss  of  credibility  within  the  framework  of  Chinese  creation  of  its  own
institutions. 
United  States  pressures  towards  ally  countries  such  as  the  United
Kingdom for not joining the AIIB are a good example, specially if it is considered
that these countries ended up ignoring the US and joining the bank. The fact
that the United States themselves acted this way can be seen as a reaction to
what they could consider to be a certain threat to its interests and the current
status quo. 
Moreover, as argued in the first sections of this work, it is clear that China
shows a certain frustration towards this system given the fact that it does not
have  the  power  it  should  have  in  the  system’s  institutions  according  to  its
growth and material power. In these terms, this frustration towards the system
may be pointed out as one of the reasons which ultimately led the country to the
creation of its own institutions and initiatives in order to develop more effectively
its foreign agenda. 
However, this work have shown that there is little evidence which states
that China’s ultimate goal could be reshaping or overthrowing this system; on
the  one  hand,  it  has  to  be  considered  that  institutions  from  this  global
governance system such as the World Trade Organization have helped China
to reach the place in global economy that enjoys nowadays. On the other hand,
the initiatives and institutions presented in this work show clearly patterns of
collaboration with the existing international order. 
Chinese  frustration  within  the  international  order,  then,  is  not  being
channeled through direct  confrontation to  it;  instead,  China is  developing its
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foreign  agenda  by  combining  the  creation  of  its  own  institutions  while,
simultaneously,  growing  its  participation  and  collaboration  with  the  existing
ones. Moreover, in Xi Jinping’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos
in January 2017, he even stated, in reference to Donald Trump’s protectionist
views of the economy, that  China is  ready to  take the lead as a free trade
champion  nation,  at  the  same  time  that  defended  globalization  in  terms  of
‘inclusive globalization’ (Elliot, Wearden, 2017).
However, this foreign agenda in which the One Belt One Road plays a
major role, cannot be totally explained without taking into account the domestic
interests that China seeks to solve through it. Especially those concerning to
overcapacity of State Owned Enterprises and private companies but also the
development of  the western regions of the country,  structural  changes in its
economy  in  order  to  boost  demand  and,  in  the  global  context,  the
internationalization of the yuan.
This process is also framed within the South-South cooperation patterns,
in which China is taking the lead, strengthening this way the country as a model
and close ally (due also to its ‘soft power’ agenda) for developing nations as
well  as a regional  leader.  It  is  here where the BRICS might  play a big role
through initiatives and institutions such as the New Development Bank, since it
means, for the first time, that the ‘Global South’ is developing its own formal
structures.  However,  the  BRICS shall  face  important  challenges  concerning
constant disagreement between countries and the recent political instability in
one of its majors members, Brazil. 
The unipolar system that the end of the Cold War originated is facing
now the biggest challenge in its more than 20 years of history. And while China
is  not  looking to  overthrow the system,  either  with  its  own initiatives or  the
BRICS  ones,  the  country  is  focusing  on  increasing  its  status  within  global
governance  and  enhancing  its  diplomatic  approaches  from  a  ‘soft-power’
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